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Crane and Tufts: Resolved and
Unresolved Issues
JOHN ZIMMERMAN*
Crane v. Commissioner and its famous footnote 37 have inspired much con-
troversy and commentary. This article discusses the issues and unresolved
questions surrounding the calculation of gain from relief of nonrecourse in-
debtedness. It does so through a thorough analysis of the actions of the courts,
the Congress, and administrative agencies. The author concludes by sug-
gesting several possible courses of action in resolving remaining ambiguities.
"No case has had greater impact on the tax law than Crane v. Com-
missioner. "1 It is well known among students of tax law as the case
which established the method of calculating gain when a taxpayer
sells property for an amount greater than the principal of the nonre-
course mortgage fixed to the property. 2 The decision has also gener-
ated considerable commentary, controversy, and numerous
questions.3
Beulah Crane inherited an apartment building from her husband
which was encumbered by a nonrecourse note of $262,000.00. She
took depreciation deductions, and then sold the building for $2,500.00
plus relief from the indebtedness. No payments were made against
the nonrecourse note while she held the building. Mrs. Crane in-
cluded a $2,500.00 gain on her tax return. The Commissioner, how-
ever, argued that she should also take into account the previous
* B.A., Glassboro State College, 1970; M.S. Taxation, Golden Gate University,
1983; certified CPA in Pennsylvania and California; published in TAXES, CPA JOUR-
NAL, ESTATES, GIFrs & TRUSTS JOURNAL, TAXATION FOR ACCOUNTANTS, PRACTICAL
ACCOUNTANT, and TAX NOTES.
1. Friedland, Tufts and Millar: Two New Views of the Crane Case and Its Famous
Footnote, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 510, 510 (1982). The case appears in 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
2. 331 U.S. at 2. Chief Justice Vinson framed the issue in these words: "The
question here is how a taxpayer who acquires depreciable property subject to an unas-
sumed mortgage, holds it for a period, and finally sells it still so encumbered, must
compute her taxable gain." Id.
3. See, e.g., Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine: An
Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX L. REV. 159 (1966); Bittker, Tax Shelters,
Non-Recourse Debt and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REV. 277 (1978); Weiss, The Crane
Case Updated, 32 TAX LAW. 289 (1979).
depreciation deductions in calculating her gain. Since she had taken
deductions, but had never paid any money on the note, it was con-
tended that she had realized economic benefit from the building.
Crane, on the other hand, argued that her equity in the building was
zero because, as conceded by the Court, its fair market value was
equal to the amount of the nonrecourse note. As a result, she con-
tended, her basis in the property was zero.4
The Supreme Court held for the Commissioner on the theory that
the taxpayer had received an economic benefit from the depreciation
deductions which she had taken. Since the nonrecourse note com-
prised the basis in the building, it was reasoned that the taxpayer
should be required to account for economic benefits realized from
such basis. The Court rejected Crane's assertion that property and
equity were synonymous. Rather, it opted for the interpretation that
property "means the land and building themselves, or the owner's
legal rights in them, undiminished by the mortgage. .. ."5
Since the Crane decision in 1947, tax shelters have become more
sophisticated and courts have been forced to develop other criteria
for determining whether or not deductions are valid. This has been
especially noticeable in cases where the nonrecourse indebtedness ex-
4. 331 U.S. at 3-5.
5. I& at 6. The underlying logic of Crane has been cited by courts when dealing
with related issues. In Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950), the taxpayer
abandoned property after taking depreciation deductions. The mortgage at the time of
abandonment exceeded the adjusted basis of the property. The taxpayer sought to dis-
tinguish his situation from Mrs. Crane in that he did not sell his property. However,
the First Circuit found no substantive difference between the two transactions. Sec-
tion 111(b) of the Internal Revenue Code (now § 1001(b)) stipulated that "amount real-
ized" came from the "sale or other disposition of property ...... I.R.C. § 111(b)
(1939). Abandonment was held to fall into the category of "other disposition." See also
Blackstone Theatre Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 801 (1949).
In Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980), the taxpayer gifted
business property which had a liability in excess of its basis. The liability assumed con-
sisted of a nonrecourse note and personal expenses incurred by Levine. The court
found the assumption of personal expenses to constitute a "sale element" and there-
fore combined both the nonrecourse note and personal expenses as the total amount
realized. The excess portion over the property's adjusted basis was recognized as gain.
The Levine court, however, unintentionally following in the footsteps of Crane's fa-
mous footnote 37 (see infra notes 9-17 and accompanying text) left the door open for
nonrecognition in a similar situation by implying that a different result might occur if
the sale element were not present in the transfer. Id at 16-17. See also Johnson v.
Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1083 (6th Cir. 1974). Although the issue in Levine has
not been definitively decided, the Supreme Court in Diedrich v. Commissioner has
cited Crane in support of the proposition that where a donee pays a gift tax on prop-
erty received and the tax exceeds the donor's basis, the excess of gift tax over basis is
income to the donor. 457 U.S. 191, 195-96 (1982). The Court's focus on an economic
benefit as a result of liability relief, albeit gift tax instead of mortgage relief, leaves
little doubt that a similar conclusion would be reached even if the Levine sale element
were missing. Id. at 197-99. Similarly, the Tax Court has found income recognition on
a charitable contribution where the liability exceeded the property's adjusted basis.
Guest v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 9 (1981).
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ceeds the fair market value of the property. In such cases, the invest-
ment in the property necessary for deductions has been found
lacking regardless of the owner's legal rights since the lack of true
indebtedness denotes the absence of legitimate investment. As the
Ninth Circuit noted in Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner: "It is
fundamental that depreciation is not predicated upon ownership of
property but rather upon an investment in property."6 This has now
become the position of the Internal Revenue Service. 7 Another view,
6. 544 F.2d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 1976). See also Fuchs v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 79,
101 (1984); Dean v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 56, 77 (1984); Odend'hal v. Commissioner, 80
T.C. 588, 604-05 (1983); Wildman v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 943, 952 (1982); Siegel v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 659, 684 (1982); Brannen v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 471, 493
(1982); Hager v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 759, 774 (1981); Narver v. Commissioner, 75
T.C. 53, 98 (1980), affd per curiam, 670 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1982); Mayerson v. Commis-
sioner, 47 T.C. 340, 350 (1966). Similarly, deductions have been denied where the obli-
gation was too contingent. See Gibson Products Co. v. United States, 637 F.2d 1041 (5th
Cir. 1981); Columbus & Greenville Railway Co. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 834 (1964);
Albany Car Wheel Co. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 831 (1963), affd per curiam, 333 F.2d
653 (2d Cir. 1965); Redford v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 773 (1957). Compare these last
four cases with Mayerson, 47 T.C. at 350-54, where deductions were allowed on nonre-
course indebtedness even though principal payments were not due for 99 years.
7. Rev. Rul. 82-244, 1982-2 C.B. 5; Rev. Rul. 78-29, 1978-1 C.B. 62; Rev. Rul. 77-110,
1977-1 C.B. 58.
The taxpayer dilemma of being denied basis because of inflated property value was
argued by the petitioner in Brannen who foresaw:
a situation in which [the IRS] will receive the best of all possible results at
both ends of a transaction. A nonrecourse note will be excluded from a tax-
payer's initial basis, thus reducing the amount of depreciation deductions to
which a taxpayer is entitled over the useful life of the property, while the full
amount of the debt will be included in the amount realized upon disposition of
the property, thus increasing the amount of gain realized.
78 T.C. at 495. The problem was addressed by the enactment of Regulation 1.1001-
2(a)(3), Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(3) (1980), which limits the amount of gain recognition
to the amount of the liability included in the basis. However, it is uncertain if there is
a provision prohibiting the Service from denying basis altogether when the note ex-
ceeds the fair market value of the property. Although section 1274(b)(3), I.R.C.
§ 1274(b)(3) (Supp. 1984) (added July 18, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369), appears to allow
basis in such situations, at least to the extent of fair market value, such an interpreta-
tion appears to have been rejected by the Joint Committee on Taxation in its report on
the Tax Reform Act of 1984. See [3 Tax Reform Act of 1984] STAND. FED. TAX REP.
(CCH) 119 (Jan. 12, 1985). However, section 752(c) could be interpreted to allow basis
to partnerships in such situations. See infra notes 56-78.
The courts had never been faced with the hypothetical problem presented in Bran-
nen before the enactment of Regulation 1.1001-2(a)(3). While Brannen's argument can
be seductively simple, it ignores the nature of deductions and gains. For example, sup-
pose a building is worth $500.00, but is encumbered by an inflated nonrecourse note of
$1,000.00. The taxpayer takes $200.00 in depreciation deductions and walks away from
the note. The full amount of the depreciation will be offset against ordinary income.
However, the gain recognition will be capital. Thus, the taxpayer gets a $200.00 deduc-
tion but only has to recognize $80.00 as income because of the 60% capital gain exclu-
sion which is applicable to real estate depreciated on the straight line method. By
however, known as the doctrine of economic interests in property, al-
lows depreciation and loss deductions where an economic interest is
established even if the taxpayer lacks the requisite legal ownership.8
Although the Commissioner prevailed in Crane, the decision has
been referred to as a "Pyrrhic Victory" because including nonre-
course debt in depreciable basis has become the "foundation for the
typical modern tax shelter."9 The advantages of nonrecourse debt
were lessened by the at risk rules of section 465 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code which were enacted into law in 1976.10 Section 465, which
deals with situations where deductions exceed income, requires debt
to be recourse before losses can be recognized."1 However, the at risk
rules do not apply to real estate.12 Therefore, real estate tax shelters
remain the most popular.
The major unresolved issue in Crane was cryptic footnote 37. It
states:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the mort-
artificially inflating the basis of the building, the taxpayer has received a net benefit of
$60.00 to which he would otherwise not be entitled (an extra $100.00 deduction because
of the inflated note, less $40.00 gain recognition upon relief of the liability).
Assuming the taxpayer in the above example is in the 50% tax bracket, overall tax
savings would be $30.00 ($60.00 x 50%). Unless deductions were denied in such situa-
tions, taxpayers could consistently create an artificial basis to increase deductions. See
Milbrew, Inc. v. Commissioner, 710 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir, 1983); Narver v. Commissioner,
75 T.C. 53 (1980), affd per curiam, 670 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1982). Similarly, interest de-
ductions have been denied on inflated nonrecourse notes. See Beck v. Commissioner,
678 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1982); Hager v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 759 (1981).
Brannen's argument, however, had some validity because his property was not real
estate. See inLfra note 25. Unlike real estate, the depreciated portion of non-real prop-
erty included in the sales price must be recaptured as ordinary income. The facts of
Brannen arose before the passage of the at risk rules of section 465, which would now
disallow deductions for losses on nonrecourse property, except real estate, regardless
of the character of the gain upon disposition. I.R.C. § 465 (1982).
8. See Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599 (1946); United States v.
Cocke, 399 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1968); Choate v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 641 (10th Cir.
1944); Rev. Rul. 77-176, 1977-1 C.B. 77; Rev. Rul. 68-361, 1968-2 C.B. 264; Sneed, The
Economic Interest - An Expanding Concept, 35 TEX. L. REV. 307 (1957).
9. Bittker, Tax Shelters, Non Recourse Debt and the Crane Case, 33 TAx L. REV.
277, 283-84 (1978); Boiling & Stover, The Supreme Court's Second Look at Crane:
What Should It Do?, 61 TAxEs, Feb. 1983, at 139. But see infra note 32.
The basis will not, however, be increased if property is refinanced unless the loan
proceeds are invested in the property. See Woodsam Assocs. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d
357 (2d Cir. 1952), where the Second Circuit would not allow a taxpayer to step up a
property's basis from a refinancing loan which was not used to improve the property.
10. Act of Oct. 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1531 (codified as amended I.R.C.
§ 465 (1982)).
11. I.R.C. § 465(b)(2) (1982). "[A] taxpayer shall be considered at risk with respect
to amounts borrowed for use in an activity to the extent that he-
(A) is personally liable for the repayment of such amounts, or
(B) has pledged property, other than property used in such activity, as security for
such borrowed amount .... Id.
12. I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D) (1982) ("the holding of real property (other than mineral
property) shall be treated as a separate activity, and subsection (a) shall not apply to
losses from such activity").
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gage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to
the mortgage. Consequently, a different problem might be encountered
where a mortgagor abandoned the property or transferred it subject to the
mortgage without receiving boot. That is not this case.1 3
It has never been determined why the Supreme Court found it neces-
sary to make this remark. Footnote 37 has been the subject of much
commentary and speculation over the years. However, the Supreme
Court has now heard a footnote 37 case and ruled that the fair mar-
ket value of the property is not a limiting factor in gain recognition.' 4
In Commissioner v. Tufts, the Court declared that where the fair
market value of property drops below the liability, gain recognition is
still required where depreciation deductions have been taken.1 5 It
held that, footnote 37 notwithstanding, Crane stands "for the broader
proposition . . . that a nonrecourse loan should be treated as a true
loan."16 Consequently, the "taxpayer must account for the proceeds
of obligations he has received tax free and included in basis."17 In
1984, the Tufts decision was codified in section 7701(g) of the Internal
Revenue Code.18
Major concerns in this area center around two sections of the In-
ternal Revenue Code. Section 1001,19 dealing with gain realized from
relief of indebtedness, has generated most of the controversy. A
newer issue deals with the correct interpretation of section 752(c). 20
Does section 752(c) deal with gain realization limitations and basis of
a partnership, or only basis? While the Supreme Court answered
many questions in Tufts, there are still unresolved issues. This arti-
cle will focus on the controversy and the remaining issues.
I. RELIEF OF NONRECOURSE INDEBTEDNESS
Prior to Crane, the issue raised in footnote 37 had appeared to be
well settled. Even though the Supreme Court had left open the pos-
sibility that relief of nonrecourse indebtedness in excess of a prop-
13. 331 U.S. at 14 n.37.
14. Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 313.
17. Id.
18. I.R.C. § 7701(g) (Supp. 1984) (The Tax Reform Act of 1984, as amended July
18, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, clarification of fair market value in case of nonrecourse
indebtedness).
19. I.R.C. § 1001 (1982).
20. I.R.C. § 752(c) (1982) ("a liability to which property is subject shall, to the ex-
tent of the fair market value of such property, be considered as a liability of the owner
of the property").
erty's fair market value would not constitute gain, the Tax Court had
ruled on the issue as early as 1943-four years before Crane. In Lutz
& Schramm Co. v. Commissioner,2 1 the Tax Court rejected argu-
ments that, because the fair market value of the property was less
than the nonrecourse liability being relieved, gain would also be lim-
ited to the property's value.22 Instead, the full amount of the liability
over depreciable basis was determined to be gain.23 In a similar case,
the Tax Court made it clear that its holding in Lutz & Schramm had
dealt with the issue "not from the standpoint of the elimination of an
indebtedness . . . but as gain upon the final disposition of prop-
erty." 24 The court was still holding this position in 1979.25
21. 1 T.C. 682 (1943).
22. Id at 685-89.
23. Id In Lutz & Schramm, the indebtedness was created by borrowing cash
against the value of the property. The Tax Court recognized that the petitioner "had
received and used for its own benefit" the proceeds of the loan. Id at 689. Although
the court was clearly stating that an economic benefit arising from nonrecourse financ-
ing had to be included in income, a lesser noticed aspect of the decision was the legiti-
mizing of income deferral through loan proceeds instead of outright sale. For
example, in Lutz & Schramm, loan proceeds of $300,000.00 were received in 1925, but
relief of the indebtedness of this amount did not occur until 1937, the year in which
the Tax Court required gain recognition. The value of such income deferral occurs
when taxpayers who need immediate cash but want to defer recognition of gain on a
sale borrow money against the fair market value of property in one year and default in
a later year. The gain will then be recognized in a later year. See also Woodsam As-
socs., 198 F.2d at 357.
This technique also allows a taxpayer to utilize a sort of modified tax straddle. For
example, the taxpayer can borrow money on a nonrecourse arrangement against the
fair market value of the property. If the value of the property goes up, it can be sold
for a greater amount than the encumbrance. If it goes down, the taxpayer can walk
away from the nonrecourse note and pocket what has already been received. To date,
however, there have been no tax cases litigated which deal with such an issue.
24. Mendham Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 320, 323 (1947). The Mendham court
sought to distinguish the Lutz & Schramm decision from the one in Nutter v. Commis-
sioner, 7 T.C. 480 (1946). In Nutter, the taxpayer had pledged securities as collateral
for a loan. The lender subsequently cancelled the loan obligation in exchange for the
pledged securities. However, the value of the securities had dropped below the amount
of the loan proceeds. In refusing to hold for gain recognition, the Nutter court found
appropriate the language used by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. American
Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 330 (1943), that the transaction "is more akin to a reduction of
sale price than to financial betterment through the purchase by a debtor of its bonds in
an arms length transaction." 7 T.C. at 483. The bond purchase language refers to the
Supreme Court's holding in Kirby Lumber where gain recognition was required when
a corporation retired its bonds at less than the issuing price. United States v. Kirby
Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
In Nutter, however, the cost basis of the securities exceeded the amount of the pro-
ceeds. The court did not address itself to what the result would be if the amount of
the loan proceeds were to exceed the cost basis. Apparently, the spirit of the Supreme
Court's decisions in Crane and Tufts would call for gain recognition. See the discussion
of Millar, infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text, which addresses the issue of relief
of nonrecourse indebtedness in excess of stock basis.
25. See Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15 (1979) (partnership held
leasing equipment with a basis of $504,000.00, fair market value of $400,000.00, and non-
recourse note of $1,182,000.00. Upon repossession of the equipment, the partnership
was required to recognize gain on the difference between the note and adjusted basis).
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It is worth emphasizing that footnote 37 clearly stated that a differ-
ent problem "might" arise where the nonrecourse debt exceeded the
property's fair market value, not that it would. The speculative na-
ture of footnote 37's language was recognized by the Third Circuit in
Millar v. Commissioner,26 where subchapter S corporation stockhold-
ers surrendered stock in exchange for their release from nonrecourse
obligations. Because the obligation exceeded the fair market value of
the stock, the shareholders argued that there was no gain because of
the exception of footnote 37. In rejecting this argument, the Third
Circuit noted: "First, it must be remembered that the footnote in
Crane was dictum. Furthermore, the footnote was but a postulate or
hypothetical observation with respect to a hypothetical set of facts
not before the Court and, indeed, involving a clearly different time
and clearly different legal circumstances." 27
In 1981, the Fifth Circuit went against the weight of authority in its
Tufts v. Commissioner decision.28 In Tufts, a partnership had held
property which had declined in value to $1.4 million and was encum-
bered by a nonrecourse note of $1.8 million. The partnership had
taken approximately $400,000.00 of deductions on the note. The Fifth
Circuit agreed with the petitioners that they should not be required
to recognize any gain based upon their relief from the indebtedness.
The court cited footnote 37 in Crane as justification for a fair market
value limitation. It rejected the economic benefit theory because of
the fact that a taxpayer could walk away from a nonrecourse note at
any time without consequences and would no longer have to contend
with the burden of ownership. Consequently, the court held, there
was no real relief of ownership because there was no burden of own-
ership. The court also rejected the idea of a double deduction theory,
expressed in Crane, that a taxpayer who takes large deductions, with-
out being at risk, has improved his economic position:
Since [these] deductions have been accounted for through adjustments to ba-
sis, it follows logically that they cannot also support an expansion of the defi-
nition of amount realized. To account for those deductions twice in the same
equation by expanding the definition of amount realized... would, we think,
be taxing the taxpayer twice on the same component of gain.2 9
26. 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978).
27. Id. at 215.
28. 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
29. Id. at 1061. The court also stated that "[t]here is simply no relationship be-
tween basis, adjustments to basis, and amount realized, except where Congress has
specifically legislated for recapture." Id. at 1064 n.9. See Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt
and Amount Realized: The Demise of Crane's Footnote 37, 59 OR. L. REV. 3, 21 (1980),
and Simmons, Tufts vs. Commissioner: Amount Realized Limited to Fair Market
It is one of the ironies of tax law that such circumstances as existed
in Millar and Tufts should even be at issue. Before Crane, it had al-
ready been well settled that relief of recourse indebtedness was the
equivalent of the receipt of money.3 0 Even the petitioner conceded as
much in Crane,31 as did the circuit court in Tufts.32 The logical re-
sult of the Fifth Circuit decision is that one who has not risked capi-
Value, 15 U.C.D. L. REV. 577 (1982). Elsewhere, Simmons writes, "[tihe relationship
between debt, basis, and amount realized do [sic] not vary with the personal liability of
the debtor. Whether or not the personal liability exists, the debtor must provide for
satisfaction of the debt before he or she may realize a gain from encumbered prop-
erty." Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt and Basis; Mrs. Crane, Where Are You Now?, 53 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 14 (1979).
The Tufts decision generated a great deal of commentary, most of it unfavorable. In
addition to the articles cited throughout this study, see also: Hemming, Footnote 37 of
Crane Reviewed, 1 B.U.J. OF TAX L. 65 (1983); Newman, The Resurgence of Footnote
37, Tufts v. Commissioner, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1982); Comment, Tufts v. Com-
missioner: Crane's Footnote 37 Reviewed, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 675 (1982); Comment,
Federal Income Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1498 (1982);
Comment, Tufts-The Resurrection of Crane's Footnote 37, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 575
(1981); Comment, Federal Income Taxation - Determination of the Amount Realized
on Disposition of Property Subject to a Nonrecourse Mortgage, 11 MEM. ST. U.L. REV.
611 (1981); Comment, Crane's Footnote Thirty-Seven Gets the Boot, 11 SETON HALL L.
REV. 679 (1981); Note, The Continuing Controversy over Crane's Footnote 37 Tufts v.
Commissioner, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 753; Note, The Amount Realized Upon Disposition
of Property Secured by a Non-Recourse Mortgage is Limited By the Fair Market Value
of Such Property-Tufts v. Commissioner, 31 EMORY L.J. 242 (1982); Note, Income Tax:
Gain Computation ... Tufts v. Commissioner, 55 TEMP. L. Q. 162 (1982).
30. United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938); Pendler v. Commissioner, 110
F.2d 477 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940); Haass v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A.
948 (1938); Bron Hotels, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 376 (1936). See also Odell &
Sons v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1165 (1947); Avery & Sons v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A.
1393 (1932).
31. 331 U.S. at 13.
32. 651 F.2d at 1061. The Fifth Circuit could have avoided some of its conceptual
problems by applying the valid investment criteria to Tufts for deductions which other
courts have used in non-Tufts cases when dealing with nonrecourse notes. See supra
note 6 and accompanying text. The court could have reasoned that since the invest-
ment which gave rise to the deductions must be valid in order for those deductions to
be sustained, the amount of the investment would not change with a fluctuation in the
fair market value of the underlying property. The court, however, implied that a non-
recourse note by its very nature denoted the absence of investment when it stated:
"The argument, we suppose, is that it is somehow unfair for a taxpayer to enjoy the
benefit of substantial deductions without having invested his own funds or placed his
own assets at risk." 651 F.2d at 1064 n.9.
The Fifth Circuit's attitude may have stemmed from its belief that since nonre-
course notes do not impose a burden of ownership, id. at 1062, the requisite investment
was lacking. Such an attitude, however, is clearly out of step with those decisions
which have sought to measure the investment by the property's value in relation to
the amount of the nonrecourse liability. See supra note 6.
Even where all the burden of ownership has been found lacking, deductions have
been sustained on nonrecourse indebtedness. In Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760
(1973), the Tax Court allowed the lessor of nonrecourse properties to take depreciation
deductions where the lessees agreed to pay all taxes, insurance and repair costs. Lease
payments were made directly to the institutional lender in satisfaction of payments on
the mortgage. For an analysis, see Lurie, Bolger's Building: The Tax Shelter That
Wore No Clothes, 28 TAX L. REV. 355 (1973).
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tal can, in some circumstances, be entitled to greater tax benefits
than one who has. The issue was not lost on the Supreme Court in
its review of Tufts v. Commissioner.33 In justifying its decision to re-
verse the circuit court and to include the full amount of the nonre-
course note in basis regardless of the property's fair market value, it
stated: "Because no difference between recourse and nonrecourse ob-
ligations is recognized in calculating basis, Crane teaches that the
Commissioner may ignore the nonrecourse nature of the obligation
in determining the amount realized upon disposition of the encum-
bered property." 34
The semantics used in Crane concerning the terms "double deduc-
tion" and "economic benefit" have contributed to the controversy.
Some tax scholars have questioned the accuracy of using these terms.
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit in Tufts several times cited an article by
Professor Boris Bittker calling into question such usage.35 While
Bittker agreed with the results of the Crane case because it brought
the tax consequences into harmony with economic reality, he re-
jected the economic benefit theory.36
33. 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
34. Id. at 309. Although the Supreme Court recognized that Crane allowed basis
for both recourse and nonrecourse notes, the Tufts Court in its own footnote opened
the way for more controversy and confusion. In note 5, the Court stated that the Com-
missioner might have argued that a nonrecourse mortgage does not constitute true
debt and could be considered a contingent liability. The Court expressed "no view as
to whether such an approach would be consistent with the statutory structure and, if
so, and Crane were not on the books, whether that approach would be preferred over
Crane's analysis." Id. at 308 n.5.
There are some serious problems with the Court's apparent reservation. Gibson
Products v. United States, 637 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1981), is cited by the Court as support
for the contingent debt possibility. In Gibson Products, a partnership was disallowed
basis because the liability was contingent upon oil well production. This was not the
case in either Tufts or Crane where the liability was fixed despite its nonrecourse na-
ture. There is simply no judicial or statutory support for expanding the definition of a
contingent liability to a fixed nonrecourse note. The at risk rules of section 465 were
an indirect codification of the principle of allowing nonrecourse financing to be in-
cluded into the basis of real property. Although section 465 deals with allowable de-
ductions when losses exist, and not computation of basis, its exclusion of real estate
from the at risk provisions makes it clear that the basis from which the deductions
flow must be left intact. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. Moreover,
Treasury Regulation 1.752-1(e) specifically allows a partnership basis for nonrecourse
liabilities on real property. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956). Consequently, an accept-
ance of the contingent liability hypothesis as it might be applied to partnerships could
only be achieved by statute.
35. 651 F.2d at 1062-63 & n.7.
36. Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REV.
277, 281-84 (1978). See also Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt and Amount Realized, supra
note 28, at 21, who also calls into question the economic benefit theory.
Similarly, the double deduction argument of the Crane Court can
be seen as questionable. There was no double deduction in the literal
sense of the term since Crane actually took depreciation only once.
What the Court appeared to be saying in Crane was that deductions
taken should be accounted for upon disposition of the property,
otherwise the effective realized gains would not be recognized.3 7
Another theory put forth to justify the Crane decision is the tax
benefit theory, which holds that prior items of deduction which are
later recouped must be recognized in income. Professor Friedland,
for example, argues that Crane is a tax benefit case, not an economics
case. "The confusion about the 'principal reasoning' of Crane stems
from the Court's unsuccessful attempt to provide a non-tax rationale
for what was essentially a pure tax decision." 38
The use of the tax benefit theory to reject footnote 37 suffers from
an obvious weakness: it refers to losses which have been taken and
later recovered (e.g., bad debt deductions), but does not apply to de-
preciation in the literal sense. Rather, it invokes the spirit of the law
that "the taxpayer is made to account for depreciation allowable
without economic investment."3 9 It could therefore be argued that
an expansion of the tax benefit theory to include depreciation would
be justified as comporting with the policy behind the statute. There
have been no tax benefit theory cases which have involved the issues
present in Crane.40
The benefit a taxpayer receives from depreciation deductions-
whether tax or economic-is equally as real as if the same taxpayer
received cash by borrowing money secured by property. If the tax-
payer forfeits the property in order to cover the debt, he has a recog-
nized gain to the extent that he has not invested the borrowed funds
in the property. Had he invested such funds in the property, he
would have been liable for gain to the extent of that part of the note
which has not been repaid but on which depreciation has been taken.
Such results inure even if the fair market value of the property is
less than the liability which encumbers it.41 Whether the taxpayer
has borrowed money against his property, which he does not repay,
37. Author's interpretation. See also Pino-Anderson, Contra Tufts: The Case
Against Fair Market Value Limitation on Amount Realized, 14 PAC. L.J. 79, 98-100
(1982).
38. Friedland, supra note 1, at 529.
39. Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized Under Crane: A Current View of Some
Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 85 (1969).
40. The principle of tax benefit has been recognized in depreciation cases. See
Texaco, Inc. v. United States, 579 F.2d 614, 616 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Russell Wolf & Co. v.
Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 59, 126 (1959).
41. Lutz & Schramm, 1 T.C. at 683; see also Woodsam Assocs., 198 F.2d at 357 (in-
volving refinancing proceeds); Halpern, Footnote 37 and the Crane Case: The Problem
That Never Really Was, 6 J. REAL ESTATE TAx. 197, 216-21 (1979) (using the terms
"economic pluses" and "minuses"). But see McGuire, On the Treatment of Realization
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or takes depreciation deductions on which there is a nonrecourse
note, the result is the same-he has enriched himself. The receipt of
cash would be an economic enrichment while depreciation is a tax
enrichment. The substance is the same even though the form is
different.
This cash equivalent logic was used by the Supreme Court in Tufts.
The Court argued persuasively that Tufts had received a "mortgage
loan with the concomitant obligation to repay by the year 2012."42
The only difference between that mortgage and one on which the borrower
is personally liable is limited to foreclosing on the securing property. This dif-
ference does not alter the nature of the obligation; its only effect is to shift
from the borrower to the lender any potential loss caused by devaluation of
the property.
4 3
The Court went on to note that the mere fact that the property had
dropped in value did not erase the fact that Tufts had received the
loan proceeds tax free.
From the mortgagor's point of view, when his obligation is assumed by a
third party who purchases the encumbered property, it is as if the mortgagor
first had been paid with cash borrowed by the third party from the mortgagee
on a nonrecourse basis, and then had used the cash to satisfy his obligation to
the mortgagee.
4 4
II. SECTION 1001(B) ISSUE
The Treasury Department, mindful of the conflicts which had
arisen, enacted regulation 1.1001-2(b) in December, 1980,45 which
stated that the fair market value of the security was irrelevant for
the purposes of determining gain: "Thus, the fact that the fair mar-
ket value of the property is less than the amount of the liabilities it
secures does not prevent the full amount of those liabilities from be-
ing treated as money received from the sale or other disposition of
the property."46 Since the issues in Tufts arose prior to the promul-
gation of this regulation, the Fifth Circuit did not have to address its
validity. However, in a persuasive and well reasoned concurring
opinion, Judge Williams cited the language of the court to support a
finding that the regulation constitutes a distortion of "the definition
of Gain on Recapturing Prior Deductions-Some Thoughts on Millar, Tufts and Foot-
note 37, 6 J. REAL ESTATE TAx. 132, 140-41 (1979) (supporting the Tufts position).
42. 461 U.S. at 311.
43. Id. at 311-12.
44. Id. at 312. The Court, in essence, was rejecting the Fifth Circuit's view that
"[i]t is not a solution to distort the definition of amount realized by finding an eco-
nomic benefit equivalent to cash where none exists." 651 F.2d at 1064 n.9.
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(b) (1980).
46. Id.
of amount realized."47 The majority opinion never specifically re-
ferred to the regulation.48 However, in response to Judge Williams,
the majority did not disassociate itself from this particular remark,49
leaving the impression that the same decision would be reached if a
post-regulation 1.1001-2(b) case were to come before the court.
Admittedly, there is precedent for judicially overturning a regula-
tion which is inconsistent with a statute.50 Judge Williams cited the
language of section 1001(b), which defines the amount realized as
"the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the
property (other than money) received."51 He saw this fair market
value limitation as justification for the court's holding. The majority,
however, disagreed with Williams that section 1001(b) was applica-
ble.52 This problem in statutory construction will be even more evi-
47. 651 F.2d at 1064 (Williams, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 1063 n.9.
49. Id.
50. See the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455
U.S. 16 (1982), where the Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3), example 1 definition of a con-
trolled group was found to conflict with section 1563(a). See also Rowan Cos. v.
United States, 452 U.S. 247 (1981); Manhattan General Equip. Co. v. Commissioner,
297 U.S. 129 (1936); Commissioner v. General Mach. Corp., 95 F.2d 759 (6th Cir. 1938);
Corner Broadway-Maiden Lane, Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1935);
American Standard, Inc. v. Commissioner, 602 F.2d 256 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Joseph Weiden-
hoff, Inc. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1222 (1959).
Generally, however, courts are inclined to defer to the regulations unless they are
clearly inconsistent with the statute. See National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United
States, 440 U.S. 472, 477, 488 (1979); Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 534 (1978);
United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967); Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber
Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948); Allen Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.
1980). A regulation will not be found to conflict with a statute where the Secretary
has been granted specific authority by the code section to prescribe the regulations.
For example, section 1502 of the Internal Revenue Code grants the Secretary specific
authority to prescribe regulations for consolidated tax returns. I.R.C. § 1502 (1982).
51. I.R.C. § 1001(b) (1982).
52. 651 F.2d at 1064 n.9 (Williams, J., concurring). It could be argued, as did Judge
Williams, that the language of the code stands on its own. See infra notes 56-85. How-
ever, it appears from reading Treasury Regulation 1.1001-1(a) that section 1001(b) may
not have been meant to cover liabilities. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1972). This would
be one explanation for the enactment of Treasury Regulation 1.1001-2 in December,
1980, which deals exclusively with liabilities. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2 (1980).
Nevertheless, the failure of the majority of the circuit courts to emphasize the literal
construction of section 1001(b) probably deprived it of the strongest argument which
could have been made to justify the Tufts decision. Instead of addressing statutory
construction, the court sought to delve into the more abstract and theoretical areas of
tax law. Consequently, the Supreme Court never had to address the language of the
statute, focusing instead on Crane's footnote 37 as well as tax and economic theories.
Indeed, had the Fifth Circuit adopted the view of Judge Williams and pressed its case,
a Supreme Court reversal could have been attacked as a rewriting of the statute.
Only Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion for the Supreme Court, mentioned
section 1001(b). Her view was that the Court should defer to the language of Regula-
tion 1.1001-2, which supports the Service's position. 461 U.S. at 317-20 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). However, Justice O'Connor's view ignores the fact that the regulation
was promulgated after the facts in Tufts arose. Therefore, if the Court had found the
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dent in dealing with section 752(c). 53 In any event, the language of
section 1001(b) does not differentiate between recourse and nonre-
course notes. Consequently, applying section 1001(b) to such situa-
tions would ignore the long-standing principle that the full amount of
recourse notes must be used for gain purposes.
The Supreme Court in Tufts never addressed itself to the specific
language of section 1001(b), as did Judge Williams in his concurring
opinion. Rather, it took the approach that "[w]hen the obligation is
canceled, the mortgagor is relieved of his responsibility to repay the
sum he originally received and thus realizes value to that extent
within the meaning of [section] 1001(b)."54 In effect, the Court held
that fair market value is to be measured for gain purposes at the time
the obligation is incurred, not upon disposition. Good reason exists to
dispute such an analysis since, as noted earlier, it is inconsistent with
the language of section 1001(b).55 However, the Court may have felt
that its interpretation was in keeping with the spirit, if not the letter,
of the law.
By taking the approach that fair market value for gain purposes is
to be measured at the time the obligation is incurred, the Supreme
Court closed off other problems presented by Tufts and Crane. The
Fifth Circuit's decision in Tufts effectively created a two-tiered basis
system, with one basis for depreciation-the amount of the note-and
one for gain-the fair market value of the property. If the fair mar-
ket value of the property were to shift below the amount of the note,
so would the basis for gain. However, the basis for depreciation
would remain constant as the original amount of the note. The
Supreme Court's reversal of the Fifth Circuit has resolved this issue
in favor of a single basis for gain and depreciation.
III. SECTION 752(c) ISSUE
Section 752(c), which applies only to partnerships, states that "[flor
purposes of this section, a liability to which property is subject shall,
to the extent of the fair market value of such property, be considered
regulation to be in compliance with the statute, it would then have had to decide
whether the regulation should be applied retroactively. See supra note 40.
53. See infra notes 56-85 and accompanying text.
54. 461 U.S. at 312 (emphasis added).
55. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Of course, the amount of the loan
"originally received" will be reduced by principal payments for gain recognition
purposes.
as a liability of the owner of the property."5 6 The respondent in
Tufts argued that even if footnote 37 of Crane did not limit the part-
nership's gain, section 752(c) did.57
The major distinguishing feature between the facts in Millar 58 and
those in Tufts is that the former involved a subchapter S corporation
while the latter involved a partnership. The difference in basis com-
putation between these two types of entities is that partners receive
basis for liabilities while subchapter S corporation shareholders do
not.
59
Section 752(c) is likely to result in as much confusion in interpreta-
tion as has footnote 37. For example, the statute does not differenti-
ate between recourse and nonrecourse debt.60 One of the two leading
texts in the area of partnership taxation argues that "it seems rela-
tively clear" that section 752(c) refers only to nonrecourse liabili-
ties.61  In fact, the issue is anything but clear. Neither the
regulations under section 752(c) 62 nor the Congressional Committee
Reports63 limit the section to nonrecourse liabilities. However, the
Internal Revenue Service has ruled that a limited partnership's basis
would be limited to $400.00, the fair market value of the property,
where the partnership paid $500.00 in cash for the property and as-
sumed a nonrecourse note for $1,500.00.64
Another problem with section 752(c) lies in its use to limit gain
56. I.R.C. § 752(c) (1982).
57. 461 U.S. at 314; 651 F.2d at 1063 n.8.
58. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
59. On these differences, see Cantor & Brill, The S Corporation: An Alternative
for Syndication, 61 TAXES 227, 232-36 (1983). See also Miller, Walking Tour Through S
Land, 10 J. REAL ESTATE TAX. 237-38 (1983).
60. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
61. W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS
AND PARTNERS 7-12 (1977). The authors, however, acknowledge that neither the stat-
ute nor the regulations specifically support this position. The other standard texts by
Willis on partnership taxation do not address the issue directly. See 1 A. WILLIS, PART-
NERSHIP TAXATION (2d ed. 1976); 1 A. WILLIS, S. PENNELL & P. POSTLEWAITE, PART-
NERSHIP TAXATION (3d ed. 1982). However, in the 1976 edition, Willis writes that "if
property having a fair market value of $10,000 and subject to an encumbrance of
$12,000 is contributed to a partnership, the amount of § 752(a) increase in the partners'
shares of partnership liabilities is limited to the $10,000 fair market value of the prop-
erty." 1 A. WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION § 22.09, at 262 (2d ed. 1976).
Since Willis helped to write the statutes on partnership taxation, the fact that he
does not distinguish between recourse and nonrecourse notes may be significant. On
the other hand, it could be argued that Willis would have realized the significance of
extending his statement to recourse notes and, therefore, would have specifically men-
tioned such an extension. However, Willis died in 1981.
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1 (1956).
63. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 236-37 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 405 (1954).
64. Rev. Rul. 80-42, 1980-1 C.B. 182-3. The ruling stated that the purchaser, a lim-
ited partnership, had to show that the payment in excess of fair market value was "not
for a purpose other than the acquisition of the ... rights." Id. Nothing in the facts of
the ruling indicates that such a situation existed, even though the general partner was
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even though it was designed to deal only with the limitation of basis.
An examination of the Committee Reports on section 752, Treasury
Regulation 1.752-1 and the other provisions of section 752 tend to con-
firm this view. There is nothing in any of these sources that deals
with gain. Rather, section 731 of the Internal Revenue Code deals
with gain or loss situations of partnerships. 65 Whatever the Congres-
sional intent may have been, the language of the code stands on its
own.
In Helvering v. Cannon Valley Milling Co., the Eighth Circuit re-
fused to restrict a statute's applicability because of a limitation sug-
gested in the Congressional Report, on the grounds that the
limitation was not in the section itself.66 The Seventh Circuit has
stated that "[c]ourts have no right, in the guise of construction of an
act, to either add words or to eliminate words from the language used
by congress."6 7 This position is illustrated in Diamond v. Commis-
sioner, where the Seventh Circuit held that the receipt of a future
profits interest in a partnership for services rendered was taxable
under section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code in the year of re-
ceipt.68 Arthur Willis, who had helped to write the statutes on part-
nership taxation, marshalled an impressive amount of authority as
support in arguing that a future profits interest should not be taxable
under Treasury Regulation 1.721-1.69 Nevertheless, the court found
such an interest taxable because the Code contained no specific ex-
emption for such interest, and section 61 includes as gross income all
income "from whatever source derived," unless directly excepted by
another section.70
a majority shareholder in the corporation selling the property. The ruling does not
deal with section 752.
65. I.R.C. § 731 (1982) (extent of recognition of gain or loss in partnerships).
66. 129 F.2d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 1942).
67. De Soto Sec. Co. v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 1956).
However, in Helvering v. Owens, 305 U.S. 468 (1939), the taxpayer took a casualty
loss for the basis of non-business property. The Service argued that the loss must be
limited to the fair market value of the property if lower than cost. Even though the
statute did not distinguish between business and non-business property for basis pur-
poses, the Supreme Court upheld the Commissioner's view. Id. at 471. Although the
Court went against the statutory construction, a possible explanation may be in "the
Court's implicit determination to reach an eminently sensible result despite the [Inter-
nal Revenue Code] draftsman's ineptitude." Bittker, Income Tax Loopholes, 17 TAx
COUNSELOR'S Q. 429-30 (1974).
68. 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
69. A. WILLIs, supra note 61, § 11.01, at 119-22. The Diamond court also noted
that there was "a startling degree of unanimity that the conferral of a profit-share as
compensation for services is not income at the time of conferral .... 492 F.2d at 289.
70. I.R.C. § 61 (1982) (gross income includes compensation for services).
The problem presented by section 752(c) was not lost on the Tax
Court which initially upheld the Commissioner in Tufts.71 That court
reasoned persuasively that the section referred only to basis, not
gain. 72 However, it also conceded that section 752(c) "is broad
enough to support petitioners' interpretation . . ... 73 The court's
conclusion that gain was not limited was supported by reference to
section 752(d)74 which states that "[iln the case of a sale or exchange
of an interest in a partnership, liabilities shall be treated in the same
manner as liabilities in connection with the sale or exchange of prop-
erty not associated with partnerships."75 Thus, section 752(d) would
appear to bring section 752(c) gain recognition situations under the
authority of those cases which hold that footnote 37 of Crane does
not limit gain recognition to the fair market value of property secur-
ing a nonrecourse note.76
Daniel Simmons presents a strong argument that, unless section
752(d) were independent of section 752(c), and therefore allowed to
control the amount of gain, it would serve no function in the statu-
tory scheme. 77 On the other hand, Judge Williams, in his concurring
opinion in Tufts, reasonably argued that the "specific imposition of a
fair market value limitation in § 752(c) would control over § 752(d)'s
general reference to the computation embracing the § 1001 definition
in the partnership taxation context."7 8 The majority, however, de-
71. Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756 (1978).
72. Id. at 766-69.
73. Id. at 768.
74. Id. at 768-69.
75. I.R.C. § 752(d) (1982).
76. 70 T.C. at 768. The Tax Court reaffirmed this position in Estate of Delman v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15, 33-34 (1979); and Brountas v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 491, 573
(1979), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 692 F.2d 152 (1st Cir. 1982).
77. Simmons, Tufts v. Commissioner: Amount Realized Limited to Fair Market
Value, 15 U.C.D. L. REV. 577, 613 (1982).
78. 651 F.2d at 1066. Justice Williams was correct in his view that a specific limita-
tion would control a general reference. However, there is good reason to believe that
such an interpretation would not be applicable to section 752.
Such limitations generally fall into two categories. The first is where the statute
specifically provides an exemption from the general purpose of the statute. For exam-
ple, section 165(a) allows a deduction for casualty losses sustained during the taxable
year. I.R.C. § 165(a) (1982). However, section 165(h) imposes a limitation on such
losses for non-business property. I.R.C. § 165(h) (1982).
The second type of limitation is where one statute specifically exempts certain situa-
tions from the general provisions of another statute. For example, in Hempt Bros. v.
United States, 490 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1974), the taxpayer, a cash basis partnership, ef-
fectuated a tax free incorporation under section 351. Among the items transferred to
the corporation were accounts receivable. The Hempt brothers argued that the part-
nership, not the corporation, should be taxed on the accounts receivable, otherwise the
transfer would constitute an assignment of income in violation of section 61. However,
the Third Circuit found the specific exception of section 351 to override the general
provisions of section 61. Id.
Section 752(c) cannot be interpreted to be a specific limitation upon section 752(d)
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voted only a footnote to section 752(c), 79 stating in essence that, since
the gain was limited by the fair market value based on other concepts
of law, it made no difference if section 752(d) embraced those other
concepts or not.8 0
The Supreme Court, like the Tax Court, felt that section 752(c)
could be applied to a sale or disposition of partnership property.8 1
However, it found section 752(d) to be inconsistent with 752(c).8 2 To
resolve the issue, the Court looked to the history of the statute and,
like most commentators on the issue, found section 752(c) to apply to
basis only.83
While the Supreme Court has cleared the air with respect to the
particular basis issue in section 752(c) presented in Tufts, the statute
still presents some unresolved problems. With basis limited by fair
market value, there could be continuous shifts in basis if the value
were to fall below the amount of the nonrecourse or recourse note.
Even though the Service has never attempted to argue this point, au-
thorities in the area have not ruled out the possibility of basis
shifts.84
As was noted earlier in the discussion of Crane's footnote 37, the
Supreme Court's decision in Tufts should effectively inhibit any po-
tential attempt to shift basis because it has standardized the basis for
gain (and hence the basis for depreciation) with the original obliga-
because there is no clear indication in section 752(c) that it is to serve such a function.
Consequently, Simmons' view, supra note 77 and accompanying text, is the better one.
79. 651 F.2d at 1063 n.8.
80. Id. Just as the Fifth Circuit failed to address the statutory construction issue
of section 1001(b), see supra note 50, a similar shortcoming in the opinion was evident
with regard to section 752(d). Since section 752(d) provides that partnership liabilities
"shall be treated as liabilities in connection with the sale or exchange of property not
associated with partnerships," I.R.C. § 752(d) (1982), a finding that the construction of
section 1001(b) supported Tufts' position would have also served to limit the gain by
reason of section 752(d) because section 752(d) implicitly requires a partnership to look
to other sections for the appropriate treatment-namely section 1001 which deals with
such issues.
81. 461 U.S. at 314.
82. Id.
83. Id at 316 n.17 (citing Reg. 1.752-1(c) as authority for the proposition that sec-
tion 752(c) refers only to transactions between a partnership and a partner).
84. Some commentators, see W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, supra note
61, at 7-13, believe that Reg. 1.752-1(c) inhibits the possibility of this happening while
not ruling it out altogether. Willis leaves open the possibility but also feels that Reg.
1.752-1(c) could limit the chance of this happening. A. WILLIS, supra note 61, § 22.09,
at 262-63. However, the 1982 edition of PARTNERSHIP TAXATION, published after Willis'
death and revised by two other authors, categorically states that Reg. 1.752-1(c) will
prohibit a basis shift. A. WILLIS, S. PENNELL & P. POSTELWAITE, supra note 61, § 44-03.
The regulation itself, however, does not directly address the issue.
tion on the property.8 5 Although the Court was addressing the prob-
lem from the perspective of footnote 37 and section 1001(b), the same
logic would seem to apply to section 752(c) since the issues in both
sections are closely related. Should the Service ever attempt to shift
a partner's basis down by using section 752(c), the taxpayer could ar-
gue that the language of the Supreme Court in Tufts prohibits such a
position. Implicit in the Court's reasoning was that the basis for de-
preciation should not fluctuate if it is the same for gain upon
acquisition.
The Supreme Court's ruling on section 752(c) is consistent with its
position on section 1001(b) and footnote 37. Had the Court accepted
the limitation on section 752(c) argued by Tufts, it would have been
offering taxpayers a way around the basic principles it was formulat-
ing in that case. Taxpayers could avail themselves of the fair market
value limitation, to which they would otherwise not be entitled, sim-
ply by forming a partnership.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court has now resolved many of the
problems surrounding Crane's footnote 37, section 1001(b), and sec-
tion 752(c), there are still issues remaining. Even though the
problems discussed above have not yet arisen, it is only a matter of
time before they may be forced on the Service and, possibly, the
courts.
The remaining issues should be addressed by the Treasury Depart-
ment through additional regulations. Such regulations should clearly
state whether or not section 752(c) is applicable to recourse as well as
nonrecourse notes. As the statute now stands, an interpretation ex-
tending it to recourse notes could be justified. However, such an in-
terpretation could put section 752(c) in conflict with the at risk rules
of section 465. Even though section 465 deals with the allowance of
deductions when losses exist, not the computation of basis, the sec-
tion clearly recognizes that both loss deductions and basis are inextri-
cably linked because without basis there can be no depreciation
deductions. Section 465(b) defines at risk to include amounts bor-
rowed on which a taxpayer is personally liable.8 6 There are no fair
85. See supra note 54.
86. The conflict could arise in the following type of situation. The partnership
purchases oil and gas property with a recourse note for $5,000.00 when the fair market
value of the property is $4,000.00. The partnership sustains losses of $5,000.00 on the
property. Section 752(c) could be read to allow losses on only $4,000.00. However,
under section 465, loss deductions on the full $5,000.00 would be allowed. Section
465(d) states, however, that the at risk rules only apply to the excess of deductions
over income. Consequently, section 465 could not be argued in a situation where there
were no losses.
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market value limitations.
A further problem of including recourse notes in section 752(c) is
that such treatment runs counter to section 1012 which defines the
basis of property as its cost.8 7 The Crane doctrine holds that the cost
of property includes liabilities. The only limitations placed upon
Crane have been where nonrecourse notes have exceeded the value
of the encumbered property or the liability is contingent.88 The ap-
plication of section 752(c) to recourse notes would create a situation
where the fair market value limitation would apply only to partner-
ships, not individuals. This would defeat the purpose of Subchapter
K-the partnership area of the Internal Revenue Code-which is
supposed to apply tax rules to partners in partnerships in the same
manner as the law is applied to individuals.89
The next area which needs to be addressed by the Treasury is the
determination of basis when the nonrecourse note exceeds the value
of the property but basis is limited to the fair market value by reason
of section 752(c). As noted earlier, the IRS has been successful in de-
nying basis altogether in some cases where property is encumbered
by an inflated mortgage note.90 Where basis is either denied in total
or restricted by reason of section 752(c), gain recognition upon relief
of the liability is limited to the extent of depreciation deductions al-
lowed by reason of Regulation 1.1001-2(a)(3). Thus, where the nonre-
course note is $200.00 and the property's fair market value is $150.00,
the basis for gain is $150.00 less depreciation deductions taken.
However, taxpayers will make principal payments on nonrecourse
property. The principal payments could be added to the initial fair
market value of the property for purposes of depreciation deductions.
For example, if in the above situation, the taxpayer makes a principal
payment of $5.00 on the note, the amount of basis for depreciation,
and gain, would be increased to $155.00. Once the taxpayer made
$50.00 in principal payments, the full amount of the $200.00 note
would be eligible for depreciation deductions. 91 This approach as-
87. I.R.C. § 1012 (1982).
88. See supra note 6. Of course, the at risk rules of section 465 also impose limita-
tions on nonrecourse financing.
89. I.R.C. §§ 701-761 (1982).
90. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. Section 752(c) has not been cited
by taxpayers, in cases where basis was disallowed in total to the partnerships, for the
proposition that basis should be allowed at least to the extent of the value of the
property.
91. The actual mechanics of this procedure would be as follows: In year one the
value of the property is $150.00, being depreciated over 15 years. The property is en-
sumes, however, that basis is not disallowed altogether.
Utilizing this technique would avoid the many tax and accounting
problems inherent in shifting the basis with the fair market value of
the property.92 Rather, the initial basis would remain fixed at the
fair market value with increases only occurring with each principal
payment. By taking steps to address these issues now, the Treasury
can help to avoid potential litigation in the future.
cumbered by a note of $200.00. The depreciation for year one is $10.00 ($150.00 - 15).
In year two the taxpayer pays $14.00 on the mortgage. The deduction for year two is
$11.00 ($150.00 + $14.00 - $10.00 taken in year one = $154.00 - 14 years, the remain-
ing life of the building). Such an approach is consistent with Proposed Regulation
1.168-2(d)(3)(ii), example two, which deals with contingent purchase prices. [1985] 3
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 22,543.
If the property is real property, an allocation will have to be made between the land
and building. See generally G. ROBINSON, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF REAL Es-
TATE 15-7 to 15-8 (1984).
92. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
